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Abstract 
Increasing demands for cost-effectiveness in surveillance for human health hazards can be met by 
1ntroducmg nsk-based principles . This 1mphes target1ng subpopulat1ons w1th h1gher nsk of Infection 
compared to the whole population. We demonstrate how historical data from surveillance can be 
used to assess risk of infection. The model is called "Discounting historical evidence" and depends 
mainly on two variables: Annual risk of introduction Plntro and surveillance system sensitivity SSe 
(ability to detect infection if present). The model Implies simulations that reiterate for a number of 
years, and for each year the output is updated with the confidence on absence of infection. 
Trichmella sp1ralis infect1on in p1gs IS used as an example. In Denmark, pigs at slaughter are tested 
(currently 23 mill1on per year), and despite of > 70 years of sampling no pigs have been found 
positive. Hence, we concluded that Plntro 1s low. SSe can be estimated from the maximum number 
of infected carcasses expected under the spec1fied design prevalence, and the sensitiv1ty of the 
test applied . According to the assessment, the prevalence of Trichmella in Dan1sh pigs is negligible 
(<1 case/ million). Based on this , a risk-based surveillance programme for Tnchmella is des1gned 
that targets all out-door reared pigs as well as all sows and boars (currently 610,000 per year). 
Compared to confined pigs, outdoor-reared pigs have higher nsk of getting Tnchinella because of 
their exposure to wildlife, wh1ch m1ght harbour Tnchmella . Sows and boars are at increased risk, 
because they live longer than fimshers . Again, SSe and Plntro are estimated and the model is 
used to show how risk-based surveillance can be applied w1thout jeopardizing human health. 
Finally, we Incorporate wildlife surveys and test quality assurance in the programme. The model 
results are included in an application to the European Commission concern1ng Denmark's status 
as a reg1on w1th negligible risk of Trichinella . 
Introduction 
Tnchinella sp1ralls IS a zoonotic infection that previously constituted a common nsk in many parts of 
the world. In Denmark, the surveillance programme for Trichinella 1s based on 1ndiv1dual sampling 
of all pigs delivered to an export authorised abattoir. An increasing number of pigs have been 
surveyed since 1930, initially by use of the compression method, and since the 1970s by the 
digestion method (currently 22 m corresponding to 99% of the annual production). No p1gs have 
ever been found positive dunng the more than 70 years that the programme has been in place. 
The question is whether a more cost-effective surveillance can be designed without jeopard1s1ng 
human health Such surveillance should be risk-based , 1.e. 1t should target the sub-populat1on(s) 
with the highest risk of Trichinella smce the a1m 1s to detect mfect1on 1f present. The question 1s 
how a risk-based approach would affect the ability to detect infection. 
The present analys1s a1med to: 
1) Demonstrate that Denmark as a reg1on has a negligible risk of Trichinella infection in domestic 
pigs 
2) Design a risk-based surveillance system that is able to identify Trichinella infection 1n the 
national p1g herd if it were present at a level above the chosen des1gn prevalence 
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Method 
A model called "Discounting historical evidencep was used for the analyses. The model was 
developed in connection with an Epilab Research Project in Copenhagen (Martin et al., in press}. 
In the following, the model will be explained in more detail. 
Two variables are of importance for the model: 
1) the annual probability of introduction of Trichinella- Plntro 
2) the sensitivity of the system (SSe) i.e. the surveillance system's capacity to identify 
Trichinella once the infection is present in the national pig herd above the level of the 
chosen design prevalence p• 
We have looked at two different scenarios: 
1) Current surveillance, where we simulated surveillance for the previous 16 years; from 
1990 to 2006. In this period we have sampled all pigs in the entire population of 
slaughtered pigs 
2) Risk-based surveillance where we only sample outdoor-reared pigs as well as sows and 
boars being slaughtered (61 0,000 pigs, 2005 estimate) 
In each scenario, 10,000 simulations were run using the software programme @Risk (Palisade Inc.). 
The choice of parameters describing Plntro in the current surveillance was based on the fact that 
Trichinella has not been found in Denmark since 1930 (Maddox-Hyttel et al., 2003). The probability 
of infection next year (Pintro) can then be conservatively estimated as: 1 I (waiting time since last 
outbreak}. corresponding to 1/76=1 .3%. To account for variation in Plntro an interval of± 25 years 
was used, corresponding to a probability range of 1.0% to 2.0%. This approach captures changes 
in risk during the 76-year period of surveillance (the risk of introduction may have varied over the 
years). but since the current system has prevented introduction for 76 years, an estimated annual 
risk varying between 1.0% and 2.0% is considered a conservative estimate. 
In a risk-based surveillance programme for Trichinella for slaughter pigs, outdoor-reared pigs as 
well as sows and boars will be sampled. Outdoor-reared pigs harbour a higher risk of introduction 
because of the possibility of contact with wildlife. Sows and boars are at increased risk because 
they have a longer possible exposure period compared to finishers. Wildlife surveys conducted in 
Denmark in 197 4-75 (Maddox-Hyttel et al., 2003), 1996-97 and 1998-99 (Enemark et al., 2000) all 
revealed a very low (<0.1 %) Trichinella prevalence m red foxes. This suggests a stable situation in 
the sylvatic Trichinella cycle in Denmark Raccoon dogs Nyctereutes procyonoides typically show a 
higher prevalence and larval burden of Trichinella than foxes. The raccoon dog is currently not 
established as a species in Denmark but it is expected to spread into Denmark in the future. The 
exact magnitude of the increased risk of introduction from wildlife to outdoor-reared pigs compared 
to Indoor-kept pigs IS unknown. We therefore chose to model the risk as an interval, where the 
lower bound of Plntro was set at tw1ce the risk that we found for Indoor-kept pigs: PlntrOoots•de = 2 x 
Plntro,ns1do = 2 x 1/76 years = 1/38 years = 2.6%. As the upper bound of Plntro we used 3 x 
Plntroms1de corresponding to 3.9%. Again, both bounds should be regarded as conservative 
estimates. 
The surveillance system sensitivity (SSe) in the current surveillance can be estimated from the 
number of mfected carcasses expected among the tested under the specified design prevalence, 
and the sensitivity of the test applied. We estimated that the prevalence of Trichinella in Denmark 
is negligible. According to EFSA (2005) this corresponds to less than one case per million 
individuals. Therefore, a design prevalence of 1/m was chosen. According to the literature, the test 
sensitivity might be as low as 40% in case only 1 g of pig muscle is sampled, and only few 
encapsulated Trichinella larvae are present (3-5 larvae/g). If more larvae are present, or larger 
amounts of meat are digested, then the sensitivity is much higher than 40% (see Forbes & 
Gajadhar, 1999). To account for variability we assumed that the sensilivity of the mdiv1dual lest 
varied from 35% to 45%. 
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Based on the Information about the expected number of infected animals and the sensitivity of the 
mdividual test, the system sensitivity 1n the present surveillance that includes all finishers was 
est1mated to be 99.99% (Table 1 ). We assumed a design prevalence (P•) of 1/m, implying that if 
Trichinella infection were present, the prevalence would be ~1/m. This 1mplies that at least 23 
Infected p1gs are expected within a population of 23 m pigs. Because of the epidemiology of 
Tnchinella, we expect that the mam part of the 23 infected p1gs w1ll be present among the outdoor-
reared pigs as well as the sows and boars. We assumed that 2/3 of the mfected pigs would be 
found here corresponding to 15 out of the 23 infected p1gs. Using these assumptions, the risk-
based surveillance system chosen will have an SSe of 99.95% (Table 2). 
Table 1 Estimated surveillance system sensitivity (SSe) for Trichmella in Danish pig production in 
the currents stem that mvolves testin of almost all 1 s current! 99% 
SSe = Prob(identifying infection) = 1-Prob(overlooking infection) = 1-(1-Se) 
Where. 
Se =Test sensitivity =0.40 
D =Expected minimum number of diseased in population= p• x N = (1/m) x23 m=23 pigs 
p• =Estimated des1gn prevalence= 1/1 .000.000 = 1/m 
N = Size of total population, here the entire national pig herd = 23.000.000 pigs 
n = Sam le size = 23.000.000 i s 
Table 2. Est1mated surveillance system sensitivity (SSe) for Trichinella in Danish pig production in 
a risk-based surveillance includin outdoor-reared i s as well as sows and finishers 
Where 
Se =Test sensitivity= 0.40 
D1 =Expected mimmum number of diseased 1n population= p• x N = (1/m) x23 m=23 p1gs 
D2 = Expected number of diseased 1n sample= Prop x D1 = 0.67 x 23 = 15 Infected p1gs 
Prop = Proportion between infected p1gs found in nsk populations (outdoor-reared pigs/sows and 
boars) and in indoor-reared pigs= assumed to be 213 = 67% 
p• = Estimated design prevalence 1n nat1onal herd = 1/1 .000.000 = 1/m 
N = Size of population, the entire national herd =23m p1gs 
n = Sam le size = finishers raised outdoor as well as sows and boars 1n 2005 = 610,000 
The Simulation model updates the probability of Infection 1n the national herd every year based on 
a combmat1on of the probability of infection at the end of last year with the probability of 
Introduction during the spec1fic year. In the first year (1990) we assume that we have no knowledge 
of the Infection, 1t m1ght be present or not. 1.e. we set the probability of mfection to 50%, which is a 
very conservative est1mate, s1nce no cases have been found 1n the preceding 60 years. In each of 
the following 16 years we survey the pigs and do not find any positive pigs; by do1ng so we 
mcrease our confidence that we do not have the infection in the nat1onal pig herd, including our 
outdoor p1g population. 
Resu lts 
According to the s1mulat1on model there is a probability of 98.6% that the national pig herd in 
Denmark currently is free from Trichinella (Probability of free adJusted 95% Cl : 98.1 %-99.0%). A 
high degree of confidence IS obta1ned already after one year Th1s is ma1nly due to the large 
sample size. Hence, the risk is entirely dnven by the annual risk of introduction Plntro, wh1ch is 
estimated to 1 3%. In a Simulation of the effect of nsk-based surveillance, the probability of 
freedom from infection is again set to 50% 1n the first year, to s1mulate a s1tuat1on without pnor 
knowledge. Because of annual sampling with no pos1t1ve findings the probability that the national 
pig herd IS free from Tnchmella 1n a nsk-based sampling scheme Increases to 96.7% after one year 
and rema1ns stable thereafter (95% Cl : 96.1%-97 3%). This IS a slightly lower probability than in 
the current system. Again, the nsk IS ent1rely driven by the annual risk of introduction Plntro, wh1ch 
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is estimated at between 2.6 and 3.9% (mean 3.3%). As with the current system, the risk-based 
surveillance achieves a high level of sensitivity after just one year. 
Discussion and conclusion 
As pointed out by a previous risk assessment report (EFSA, 2005), the existence of true 
Trichinella-free areas/countries is very unlikely, because even though Trichinella may be absent in 
domestic pigs it may still be present in wildlife. What we can conclude from our simulations based 
on surveillance data from a 76-year period with increasing intensity is that the prevalence in 
domestic pigs in Denmark has been negligible and that Denmark is a low-risk area for Trichinella in 
pigs for slaughter. Therefore, risk-based sampling targeting sub-populations with higher risk is 
justified. 
Sampling the entire population of 160,000 outdoor-reared pigs plus 450,000 sows and boars only 
gives a slightly lower confidence instead of sampling 23 m indoor-reared pigs. The negligible risk of 
infection among confined (i.e. indoor-reared) finishers is due to the strict biosecurity in place in 
Danish indoor pig herds. Hereby, outdoor-reared pigs will act as a sentinel for infection of 
Trichinella in the national herd. Similarly, testing of 450,000 sows and boars will act as an indicator 
of infection in individual herds in the event of infection in wildlife and biosecurity failing to prevent 
introduction of Trichinella. The sows and boars will be tested for Trichinella no matter if they are 
raised in confinement or outdoors, and no matter where they are slaughtered (export 
slaughterhouse or local butcher). 
The model by Martin et al. (in press) assumed an "all other things equal" situation. For Trichinella, 
it may be argued that the advent of the raccoon dog means an increased risk of Trichinella 
transmission. If an infected raccoon dog harbours more Trichinella larvae than foxes (Oivanen et 
al., 2002), and if this results in a higher degree of exposure of outdoor pigs, then there is a higher 
likelihood that infection will be identified through the surveillance system in place. Moreover, the 
decreasing number of pig farms in Denmark will inevitably lead to larger indoor farms with better 
biosecurity. 
The model results are included in an application to the European Commission concerning 
Denmark's status as a region with negligible risk of Trichinella. A decision is expected in 2007. The 
proposed risk-based surveillance programme for Trichinella in Denmark will also include annual 
wildlife surveys, pig traceability, contingency plans and test quality assurance. 
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